Jerry Lucas

The Equation That Beat Wall Street

· Finance

Isaac Newton was one of the smartest people who ever lived. He invented calculus, discovered the laws of motion, and figured out why planets orbit the sun. In 1720, he lost a third of his fortune in the stock market.

Newton was 77 years old and rich. Decades as a Cambridge professor, a side hustle as Master of the Royal Mint, a net worth of around £30,000 (roughly $6 million today). He invested in the South Sea Company, which shipped enslaved Africans across the Atlantic, watched his shares double by April, and sold, a smart move. Then the stock kept climbing, and Newton couldn't resist. He bought back in at the peak, kept buying as prices fell, convinced he was buying the dip. There was no dip. When asked why he didn't see it coming, Newton said, "I can calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies, but not the madness of people."

Two hundred and sixty-eight years later, a mathematics professor named Jim Simons set up the Medallion Investment Fund. Every year for the next 30 years, the fund returned 66% per year. At that rate, $100 invested in 1988 would be worth $8.4 billion today. Simons became the richest mathematician of all time, and he did it by solving exactly the problem Newton said was impossible.

The equation that made it possible didn't come from economics. It came from physics, from discovering atoms, understanding how heat moves through metal, and figuring out how to count cards at a Las Vegas blackjack table. The best people to ever beat Wall Street were never traders. They were physicists, code breakers, and mathematicians.

The Wine Merchant's Son

The story begins with Louis Bachelier, born in 1870. Both of his parents died when he was 18, forcing him to take over his father's wine business. He sold it a few years later, moved to Paris to study physics, and found a job at the Bourse (the Paris Stock Exchange) to support himself.

Inside was Newton's madness of people in its rawest form. Hundreds of traders screaming prices, making hand signals, cutting deals. Most people would have seen chaos but Bachelier saw a math problem.

What fascinated him were options, contracts that had existed since at least 600 BC, when the Greek philosopher Thales of Miletus pulled off what might be history's first financial hustle. Thales believed the coming summer would yield a massive olive harvest. He couldn't afford to buy olive presses outright, so he paid press owners a small fee to secure the option to rent their machines later at a fixed price. When the harvest came and he turned out to be right, rental prices skyrocketed. Thales paid the pre-agreed rate, rented the machines out at the market price, and pocketed the difference.

That's what a call option is. You pay a small premium now for the right (not the obligation) to buy something later at a locked-in price. If the price goes up, you profit. If it doesn't, you lose only the premium. The inverse, a put option, gives you the right to sell at a locked-in price, useful if you think prices will drop.

Say Apple stock is trading at $100 and you think it's going up. You could buy shares directly, or you could buy a call option for $10 that locks in the right to buy at $100 in one year. If the stock climbs to $130, you exercise the option, buy at $100, sell at $130, subtract the $10 premium, and walk away with $20 profit. That's a 200% return on your $10 investment, compared to the 30% you'd have made buying the stock outright. If the stock drops to $70, you just don't exercise the option and you've lost $10 instead of $30. Options give you leverage on the upside and limit your losses on the downside, which is why they're also used as insurance. An airline worried about fuel costs can buy options that pay off if oil prices spike. A farmer can lock in crop prices months before harvest. Once people wanted to buy that kind of protection, others wanted to sell it for a profit, and that's how options markets were born.

Options had been traded for centuries, but here was the problem nobody could solve. How much should an option cost? There was no formula. Traders just haggled until they agreed on a price. Bachelier thought there had to be a mathematical answer, proposed it as his PhD topic to his advisor Henri Poincaré, and to his surprise, Poincaré said yes.

The Radiation of Probabilities

To price an option, you need to know what stock prices do over time, and Bachelier's insight was counterintuitive. You can't predict them. The price of a stock is set by a tug of war between buyers and sellers, influenced by weather, politics, competitors, innovation, rumors, mood. Predicting all of that is impossible, so Bachelier argued that at any point in time, the price is just as likely to go up as it is to go down. Stock prices follow a random walk, as if each step is determined by a coin flip.

This sounds defeatist, but it's actually powerful. Imagine a Galton board, a triangular grid of pegs with thousands of ball bearings poured through the top. Each ball hits a peg and goes left or right at random. You can't predict any individual ball's path, but all the balls together always form the same shape, a normal distribution, tallest in the middle (where there are thousands of possible paths) and tapering at the edges (where a ball would have to go left at every single peg). Bachelier realized that stock prices work the same way. You can't predict a single price movement, but you can describe the probability of where the price will be at any future time.

Then he noticed something strange. The equation he'd derived was identical to one Joseph Fourier had published in 1822, describing how heat radiates from hot regions to cold ones. Stock prices and heat conduction followed the exact same mathematics. Bachelier called his discovery the radiation of probabilities.

The physics community ignored him because he was writing about money. Meanwhile, the random walk Bachelier had discovered was about to solve a completely different mystery.

In 1827, the botanist Robert Brown noticed pollen grains jittering randomly in water under a microscope. Dust from lava did the same thing. Meteorite fragments did the same thing. Anything small enough moved randomly, and nobody could explain why. Eighty years later, in 1905, Einstein figured it out. Trillions of invisible molecules were slamming into each particle from every direction at every instant. The occasional imbalance created visible jumps. The math describing this was the same random walk, the same normal distribution spreading over time, that Bachelier had already derived five years earlier. Einstein had no idea.

Bachelier had beaten Einstein to the random walk, and he'd solved the options pricing problem that had stumped traders for centuries. His thesis showed that the fair price of an option is the one that makes the expected return for buyers and sellers equal. Both sides should stand to gain or lose the same amount.

Nobody cared. Physicists weren't interested in finance, and traders weren't interested in math. Bachelier died in obscurity. The key thing missing wasn't the theory. It was someone who could use it to make a fortune.

The Biggest Casino on Earth

In the 1950s, a young physics PhD named Ed Thorp was studying in Los Angeles while Las Vegas was becoming the gambling capital of the world. Thorp drove out to the desert and sat down at a blackjack table. Back then, dealers used a single deck, so Thorp could mentally track every card that had been played and calculate, in real time, when the remaining deck favored the player. He bet big when the odds were with him and small when they weren't. He had invented card counting, a remarkable innovation considering blackjack had been around for centuries and no one had thought to do the math.

The casinos eventually caught on and added more decks. So Thorp took his skills to what he called the biggest casino on Earth, the stock market. His hedge fund returned 20% annually for 20 years, the best track record anyone had seen. The principle was the same. Calculate the odds, bet when they're in your favor, and hedge your losses.

Thorp pioneered dynamic hedging, a technique where you offset the risk of selling an option by holding a carefully calculated amount of the underlying stock. If the stock goes up, you lose on the option but gain on the stock. If it drops, you sell the stock. A hedge portfolio Π\Pi offsets the option VV with stock Δ\Delta at any given moment,

Π=V−ΔS\Pi = V - \Delta S

You've created an option out of nothing, synthetically manufacturing it through continuous trading. Thorp also improved on Bachelier's model by accounting for the fact that stock prices aren't purely random. They can drift upward or downward over time depending on how the business is doing. By 1967, Thorp had worked out a more accurate pricing model, and he told nobody. He kept it for his own fund, used it to spot mispriced options, and quietly printed money for his investors, but this lasted only until 1973.

The Most Famous Equation in Finance

That year, Fischer Black and Myron Scholes published a paper that blew the door open. Robert Merton independently published his own version grounded in stochastic calculus and is also credited. Thorp's secret was out, and the new formulation was tighter than his.

Their reasoning was elegant. If you can construct a risk-free portfolio through dynamic hedging (exactly what Thorp was already doing), then that portfolio should earn nothing more than the risk-free rate, whatever US Treasury bonds are paying. No extra risk, no extra reward.

The derivation starts with two ingredients. First, a model of how stock prices move, Geometric Brownian Motion,

dS=μS dt+σS dWdS = \mu S \, dt + \sigma S \, dW

where μ\mu is the expected return, σ\sigma is the volatility, and dWdW is a random Brownian-motion shock. Second, a hedged portfolio,

Π=V−∂V∂SS\Pi = V - \frac{\partial V}{\partial S} S

which eliminates the random component through dynamic hedging. By applying Ito's Lemma (a formula from stochastic calculus that describes how functions of random processes change over time) and setting the portfolio's return equal to the risk-free rate,

dΠ=rΠ dtd\Pi = r\Pi \, dt

the random terms cancel and everything simplifies into the Black-Scholes-Merton equation,

∂V∂t+rS∂V∂S+12σ2S2∂2V∂S2−rV=0\frac{\partial V}{\partial t} + rS \frac{\partial V}{\partial S} + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 S^2 \frac{\partial^2 V}{\partial S^2} - rV = 0

This single equation relates the price of any derivative to any underlying asset. Solve it for a European call option and you get the Black-Scholes formula,

C=S0 N(d1)−K e−rT N(d2)C = S_0 \, N(d_1) - K \, e^{-rT} \, N(d_2)

d1=ln⁡(S0/K)+(r+σ2/2) TσT,d2=d1−σTd_1 = \frac{\ln(S_0 / K) + (r + \sigma^2 / 2) \, T}{\sigma \sqrt{T}}, \quad d_2 = d_1 - \sigma \sqrt{T}

Plug in the stock price, strike price, time to expiration, risk-free rate, and volatility. Out pops a number. For the first time in history, traders didn't have to haggle over option prices. They could calculate them, and the industry adopted it almost overnight.

The Trillion-Dollar Chain Reaction

The same year, the Chicago Board Options Exchange opened its doors. Within two years, the Black-Scholes formula was Wall Street's benchmark. The options market has been doubling roughly every five years since, a financial equivalent of Moore's Law. Credit default swaps, over-the-counter derivatives, securitized debt, all multi-trillion-dollar industries that trace back to this equation.

The impact went far beyond Wall Street. Every large company, government, and individual investor now uses derivatives to manage risk. Options turned uncertainty into something you could measure, price, and trade like any other commodity.

The GameStop saga in 2021 showed the other side of that power. A group of Reddit users on r/wallstreetbets wanted to punish hedge funds that were shorting GameStop stock. Buying shares alone wasn't enough. With a dollar of cash, you can buy a dollar of stock, but a dollar of options can move $10 or $20 worth of stock. That leverage sent GameStop up over 700% and cost short sellers billions.

Today, the global derivatives market is worth several hundred trillion dollars, multiples of the value of the underlying assets. That sounds insane (more money riding on the bets than on the things themselves), but derivatives let you slice one asset into dozens of versions tailored to different risk appetites. During normal times, this creates liquidity and stability. During a crisis, when everything moves in one direction at once, it amplifies the crash.

In 1997, Merton and Scholes won the Nobel Prize in Economics. Black was acknowledged but had died two years earlier. The secret was out, and everyone on Wall Street now had the same formula. Hedge funds would need to find entirely new edges.

The Code Breaker

Jim Simons was a world-class mathematician before he ever touched the stock market. His work on Riemannian geometry influenced knot theory, quantum field theory, and quantum computing. Chern-Simons theory helped lay the foundation for string theory. In 1976, the American Mathematical Society gave him the Oswald Veblen Prize, one of the highest honors in geometry.

Simons had also spent time at the US Institute for Defense Analysis during the Cold War, breaking Soviet codes by finding patterns in massive datasets. He became convinced the same approach could crack the stock market.

When he founded Renaissance Technologies in 1978, he didn't hire traders. He hired physicists, astronomers, mathematicians, and statisticians, people who had done serious science and done it well. He didn't care if they'd never heard of a stock option. In the early days, data didn't even exist on computers, so his team went down to the Federal Reserve and copied interest rate histories by hand.

One key hire was Leonard Baum, who pioneered Hidden Markov models. The idea mirrors Einstein's insight about Brownian motion. You can't see atoms directly, but you can detect their effects. Similarly, you can't see the hidden forces driving markets, but you can infer them from observable data. Using these models and other machine learning techniques, Renaissance launched the Medallion Fund.

It returned 66% per year for 30 years. The best investment track record in history, by a wide margin. Bradford Cornell of UCLA wrote a paper titled Medallion Fund: The Ultimate Counterexample? arguing that performance this consistent couldn't be explained by luck. It suggested the Efficient Market Hypothesis itself might be wrong. Markets aren't perfectly random. There are patterns, if you have the right models, the right people, and the computational power to find them.

The people who found those patterns were never traders. They were physicists who understood random walks, mathematicians who could spot structure in noise, and code breakers trained to extract signal from chaos. They changed the world's understanding of risk, created markets worth hundreds of trillions of dollars, and proved that the madness of people Newton gave up on could, in fact, be calculated.

There's a deep irony in this. If we ever discovered all the patterns in the stock market, knowing them would allow us to exploit them, which would eliminate them. We'd finally have a perfectly efficient market where every price movement is truly random. The ultimate success of this project would be to make the project impossible.